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Polls in the United States have long indicated that a clear majority of Americans
believe that “the United States [is] a Christian nation.”1 At the same time they indicate
that a minority – no more than 30% -- support a constitutional amendment that would
make the belief a feature of the nation’s fundamental law. But suppose it were the case
that the sentiment for constitutional change corresponded with the public’s perception
on this question, culminating in a successful deployment of Article V of the
Constitution? Would the Supreme Court declare the amendment unconstitutional?
The rationale for doing so is clear: the text of the First Amendment and
generations of judicial interpretation of its religion clauses are unambiguous in
affirming the official neutrality of the American regime with respect to religion.
Whatever disagreement has existed as to the role of government in supporting religion
in a non-preferential way, no serious constitutional position can be found for permitting
the authoritative embrace of a specific faith.
It is also the case, however, that the Supreme Court, unlike courts in some other
countries, has never declared a constitutional amendment unconstitutional on
substantive grounds. Moreover, it has indicated a clear disinclination to do so. One
country that has exercised its judicial power in this manner is Turkey, which very
recently overturned an amendment that violated the nation’s constitutional
commitment to a secular way of life, that requires eliminating religion from the public
domain. Turkey, a country whose people is nearly entirely Muslim, arguably would
accept some official recognition of that fact, but its identity as a constitutional republic

See, for example, Andrew Kohut, John C. Green, Scott Keeter, and Robert C. Toth, The Diminishing
Divide: Religion’s Role in American Politics (Washington: Brokings Institution Press, 2000), 100.
1

1

has led it over the years to insist on an aggressively secular subordination of religion to
a private, and largely hidden, sphere.

Before returning to the original question, consider the following Turkish story,
beginning with two similar statements that in context demand opposite things.
“It is our purpose to create completely new laws and thus to tear up the
very foundations of the old legal system.”2
“We need to change the soul of the Turkish Constitution.”3
Four score and three years separate these calls to action by two Turkish
political figures. The occasion for the first was a speech in 1925 delivered by Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk at a new law school in Ankara, in which the founder and first
President of the Republic of Turkey laid out the case for a new civil code that
promised to transform the ways in which the people of his nation would henceforth
relate to one another. For the second it was an appearance at an old law school in
Cambridge, Massachusetts by the Deputy Chairman of Turkey’s governing party,
who was explaining why his Constitution required certain changes that would enable
it to reflect the shifting underling realities of Turkish society. A few months after
Ataturk’s address, the Turkish Assembly adopted a radical new civil code modeled
after the Swiss example; nine weeks after the party leader’s appeal for a change in the
nation’s constitutional soul, the country’s highest court invalidated amendments to
the Constitution, whose soul-altering ambitions were deemed too radical for
maintaining the coherence of the document.4
Both of the speakers were arguably engaged in some measure of rhetorical
excess; for example, it had been a staple of the governing Justice and Development
Party’s (AK Party) professed ideological commitments to preserve the fundamentals
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, as quoted in Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (3rd ed.) (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 274.
3 Dengir Firat, as quoted in The Record (Harvard Law School), April 24, 2008.
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of the secular settlement codified in Kemalist constitutionalism, which, to be sure, the
party had conveniently chosen to understand as not having succeeded in completely
eviscerating Turkey’s pre-existing Ottoman legal foundations.5 But rhetoric aside,
these statements call attention to a critical and perplexing issue in comparative
constitutional theory: what are we doing when we invoke the particular attributes or
characteristics of a constitution that enable us to identify it as a unique legal and
political phenomenon?
The Turkish case, as embodied in the transition from Ottoman rule to secular
republicanism is, to be sure, an unusually dramatic instance of an attempt to destroy
an existing constitutional identity; while not unique, most narratives of transition
have unfolded more seamlessly than in Turkey. An important recent turning point
may have occurred in the Constitutional Court’s decision in 2008 overturning two
constitutional amendments that had been adopted with the support of 80% of the
Grand National Assembly. The amendments were inspired by concerns about
religious liberty that, in the language acceded to by the legislature, were draped in an
article of clothing. Since the time of Ataturk and his attack on the fez and other items
of traditional Muslim attire, garments had become an important symbolic focus for
the effort to re-constitute Turkish national identity; indeed, as was well understood by
everyone involved in the amendments controversy, the religious liberty issue itself
had a constitutive significance that transcended the debate over theologically
prescribed head coverings.6
Whether or not the underlying purpose of the amendments was to “change the
soul of the Turkish Constitution,” at a minimum it represented the next logical step in
See, for example, Esra Ozyurek, “Public Memory as Political Battleground: Islamist Subversions of
Republican Nostalgia,” in Esra Ozyurek, ed., The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 2007).
6 As has been vividly detailed by Bernard Lewis, Ataturk launched his assault on the fez in an August
1925 speech, in which he and his compatriots wore Panama hats for the occasion. In his speech he
made clear how his sartorial concerns implicated a larger purpose. “[T]he aim of the revolutions we
have been and are now accomplishing is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into a state of
society entirely modern and completely civilized in spirit and form. This is the central pillar of our
Revolution, and it is necessary utterly to defeat those mentalities incapable of accepting this truth.”
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 410.
5

3

an ongoing political contest over the right of women in Turkey to wear headscarves in
institutions of higher learning. For those who opposed the official ban on this
religiously freighted apparel choice, the more conventional avenues to achieving their
goal had been exhausted, as had been made very clear as early as 1989 in a judgment by
the Constitutional Court annulling headscarf-friendly legislation.7 But societal
developments subsequent to that decision (including the enhancement in wealth and
status of religious Turks) had markedly improved the political environment for a
relaxation of the more demanding of secular requirements, with polls showing
overwhelming support for allowing university students to wear the headscarf. As a
Turkish constitutional lawyer put it, “The rules [banning scarves, etc.] served a purpose
when Turkey was forging a national identity out of the remains of the Ottoman
Empire. But now Turkey has outgrown them.”8
Outgrowing the rules implied a need to amend the principle of laicity (requiring
in the Turkish experience a public space free from expressions of religious identity),
which its advocates insisted was not tantamount to rejecting the Constitution’s
commitment to secularism. But for the defenders of the divergent Kemalist
understanding, the two amendments that explicitly provided for the headscarf right did
precisely that by contradicting the very foundations of the secular state. These
foundations, they maintained, were “irrevocable” under the Constitution, which meant
that any effort to amend them would have to be deemed illegitimate. Thus Article 4
states: “The provisions of Article 1 of the Constitution establishing the form of the state
as a Republic, the provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic [‘a
democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law’], and the provision of
Article 3 [the state as ‘an indivisible entity’] shall not be amended, nor shall their
amendment be proposed.” Translation: the essentials of Turkish constitutional identity
are unalterable.
With a decisive 9-2 vote the Constitutional Court concluded that the
The 1989 decision received international legitimacy when the European Court of Human Rights
upheld its ruling in 2005 in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey
.
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amendments did indeed undermine secularism, “the basic principle of the Republic,”
and therefore they were in express violation of the mandate of Article 2.9 But in doing
so, the Court’s bold decision raised as many questions about constitutional
fundamentals as it answered, particularly with respect to the significance of its own
actions. Under Article 148, which establishes the functions and powers of the
Constitutional Court, the Court may examine constitutional amendments “only with
regard to their form.” This limited jurisdiction stands in contrast with its review
power over ordinary legislation, where it is authorized to evaluate laws “in respect of
both form and substance.” Thus in striking down the amendments on substantive
grounds, the Court exposed itself to the criticism that it was itself transgressing the
Constitution.10 And so after its ruling people were urged to express their opposition
to “the judiciary’s breach of constitutional order and popular sovereignty [by]
pressuring their representatives to leave aside political differences and prioritize
constitutional change as the most urgent issue facing Turkey today.”11 To be sure,
political affiliation can account for the most intense reactions to the decision, as in the
ominous declaration, “This is the end of democracy as we know it and the emergence
of juristocracy in its place.”12 But partisan hyperbole to the contrary notwithstanding,
the subverting of a constitutional change supported by 441 of the country’s 550
The Court’s decision led many to believe that its outcome foreshadowed the much-anticipated ruling
on the possible banning of the AKP, which at the time of the headscarf litigation was already before the
Court. It came, therefore, as something of a surprise when on July 30, 2008 the Court narrowly rejected
the closing option. In doing so, however, it issued a “serious warning” to the Party not to continue
steering the nation in an Islamic direction. The outcome probably avoided a constitutional crisis; what
remained unclear was the effect of the decision, in connection with the headscarf ruling, on the
evolving Turkish constitutional identity.
10 That it did so must have taken some observers by surprise, as this statement written prior to the
ruling suggests. “An attempt by the Turkish Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of
amendments made in Article 10 and 42 of the Constitution, which the Turkish Grand National
Assembly passed, in terms of content such as laicity, would therefore amount to a blatant violation of
the Constitution. We see no possibility that the Constitutional Court would dare to take this route.”
Mustafa Sentop, “The Headscarf Ban: A Quest for Solutions,” Seta Policy Brief, March 2008, No. 8, 6.
The author’s sympathies for the ruling party may have colored his opinion, but given the
aggressiveness of the Court’s move it is unlikely that he was alone in his prediction.
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parliamentarians presents an inescapable challenge to theorists of constitutional
democracy.
Thus however tendentiously put, the anti-democratic critique hardly seems farfetched in light of the extraordinary display of judicial activism inherent in any
judicial invalidation of a duly enacted constitutional amendment. Surely it provokes
one to consider the ironic possibility that in its determination to defend the secular
identity of the state the Court had run afoul of its republican identity. But there is an
additional identity-related concern to consider. The indictment of the Court for
abusing its authority was only partially based on procedural objections; it also had a
substantive dimension: “[t]he judiciary’s insistence on a static identity,” its imposition
of “an archaic ideology through judicial activism.”13 In short, the accusation against
the Court included the contention that it had become an impediment in the way of
achieving a necessary convergence between constitutional law and the changing
realities of Turkish society.14 To the charge that the amendments represented a frontal
assault on the Constitution’s very identity, the rejoinder was that identity must be
viewed as an evolving phenomenon whose meaning and vitality could only be
preserved if its content reflected significant shifts in societal mores and behavior.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt anything like a comprehensive
assessment of the issues raised by this case; instead I want to highlight several points
that may be pertinent to the question raised at the outset.
a) Invocation of the irrevocability provisions of Article 4 to protect the essentials
of the Turkish Constitution rests on the assumption that “the characteristics of the
Republic” – specifically in this instance, secularism – have a discernible meaning and
coherence that will enable political actors (the Constitutional Court?) to defend them
when they are under assault, even if the assault materializes through the precise form
specified in the document. Let us assume that such characteristics establish the basics
Ibid., 4.
Procedure and substance are of course inseparable. Thus “the judiciary’s breach of constitutional
order and popular sovereignty” prevented the system from “prioritiz[ing] constitutional change as the
most urgent issue facing Turkey today.” Ibid.,
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of the constitutional identity of the Turkish Republic. Let us also assume that we
have, based on an extensive documentary record of Kemal Ataturk’s radical
transformation of state/religion relations in that country, a fairly clear sense of the
core meaning of secularism as it had been understood by the framers of the postOttoman Constitution and its later incarnations. And let us further assume that this
meaning is closely tied to the Western orientation of the regime’s revolutionary
founders and their fervently held goal of Turkish modernization.
Can we then know with certainty what is and is not irrevocable when speaking
of Turkish constitutional identity? I would suggest that an affirmative response ought
to be received skeptically. The reason for such uncertainty is not unique to the
Turkish case, nor does it require adherence to a theory of constitutional
indeterminacy; instead it lies in the dynamic quality of identity and the dialogical
process by which it is formed and develops. Turkey’s secularism, for example, was
not a simple product of the imagination, but was and remains embedded in a deep
cultural matrix from which counter-pressures to the dominant ideology exert a
continuing, if irregular, force seeking a more favorable standing for religious identity,
specifically for the nation’s overwhelmingly Muslim majority (99% of the population).
As noted by Bernard Lewis, “Westernization has posed grave problems of identity for
a people who, after all, came from Asia, professed Islam, and belonged by old
tradition to the Middle Eastern Islamic world where, for many centuries, they had
been unchallenged leaders.”15 The removal of Islam from the Constitution in 1928
may rightly be taken to have signaled the triumph of legal secularism, but then to
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, xi. In line with this observation, Serif Mardin
concludes, “The Turkish Revolution was…primarily a revolution of values in which the revolutionaries
still showed the influence of their Ottoman-Islamic background.” Serif Mardin, Religion, Society, and
Modernity in Turkey (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 203. Or as a Turkish scholar has
observed about that nation’s problem of identity, “[T]he danger with the Republic is that while it tries
to eliminate primordialism, it opens itself to being possibly kidnapped by a monological retribalization.
In other words, as it shrinks the dialogical space between the public persona and self-identity and it
leaves itself most vulnerable to the distortions of both, when under real or imagined duress.””From
Affiliation to Affinity: Citizenship in the Transition from Empire to the Nation-State,” in Seyal
Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranovic, Identities, Affiliations, andAllegiances (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 41.
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understand that subtraction as having excluded a religious presence from the domain
of constitutional identity would be highly questionable. Rather, the pervasiveness of
Islamic traditions in Turkish society strongly suggests that the content and parameters
of the Constitution’s secular mandate possess a mutability that varies with the relative
strength of these traditions and their more worldly competitors. An Islamic presence
relegated to the sidelines by a largely unchallenged judiciary and military will push
the boundaries of secularism in the direction of a stronger commitment to religious
liberty as its political and economic condition improves. But any additional push
fueled by theocratic ambitions will doubtless be successfully resisted as an
unambiguous threat to constitutional identity.
Thus one way of interpreting the political struggles in Turkey today is to see
them as an integral part of the give and take of identity politics, as a central element of
the interactive process intrinsic to a constitutional work in progress. “Turkey is an
unfinished symphony. We have been looking for a constitution for the last 150
years.”16 As the actors in this process work to shape a public consensus supportive of
their positions on constitutional change and continuity, they seek to turn the
discordant notes of Turkey’s complex constitutionalism into a harmonious
composition that, while serving their political interests, can be presented as the
fulfillment of the common good. The headscarf problem is a focal point for these
efforts, with both sides to the controversy drawing heavily on different parts of the
nation’s conflicted tradition to advance their vision of a secular republic true to the
authentic voice of the Turkish people.
b) Unlike symphonies performed for concert, there is no one composer of a
constitution to whom the responsibility lies to create a work that, if successful, may
dazzle us with its compelling unity and harmonious compositional integrity. For all
its distinctive features, the Turkish constitutional arrangement has, in the fashion of
its genre, multiple creators with sometimes competing agendas, who may find
Quoting Zuthtu Arslan in Brendan Sweeney, Turkey’s Search for a Workable Constitution,”
http://www.humanrights.dk/News/Turkey’s+Search+for+workable=Constitution.
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themselves pressing their cases from different institutional vantage points. As the
developments in Turkey illustrate, a constitution is a large piece of a nation’s
constitutional identity, but it is not coterminous with it. In most cases it lays down
key markers of that identity, which are then adapted to changing political and social
realities in ways that modify, clarify, or reinforce it through the dialogical engagement
of various public and private sources of influence and power.
The debate over the legitimacy of a given constitutional amendment reflects this
dynamic. In the headscarf case, the Court said that a basic principle – X (secularism) –
is unamendable, and that an amendment – Y – was invalid because it contradicted X;
thus its proponents were in effect committing an act of constitutional identity theft.
The Assembly, on the other hand, while also accepting X as unamendable, viewed Y
as consistent with X, as well as to its commitment to basic principle Z (republicanism)
and its corollary obligation to interpret X in accordance with the sovereign popular
will. From its alternative perspective the Court, by virtue of its aggressive judicial
activism, was itself a perpetrator of constitutional identity theft through its improper
flouting of Z. Moreover, any claim by the Court that the only valid identity-fixing
meaning of X was its own rendering of the specific authorial intent behind X, was
undermined by the embarrassing detail of X’s having been included in 1982 as part of
an undemocratically produced document, the only genuine voice of the constituent
power was actually located in the legislative branch through its assertion of the
amendment power. Not only, therefore, did the Court’s own unaccountability
undercut its assertion of monopolistic authority over constitutive foundational
questions, but its critics could argue that the document over which it claimed such
authority was, by virtue of its authoritarian adoption, similarly suspect.17
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I now return to the original question and ask whether there are any lessons from
the Turkish experience that might illuminate the predicament of the American
Supreme Court were it faced with a challenge to an amendment that violated the
prescribed place of religion in the constitutional order. Without providing answers
myself, I will, in the hope that it might stimulate useful discussion, list a series of
relevant questions and considerations drawn from the Turkish case.
1) In a subsequent ruling by the Turkish Constitutional Court a narrow majority
decided not to use its specific powers under Articles 68 and 69 to ban the country’s
governing party for doing things like generating the constitutional amendments
previously declared unconstitutional for violating the secular foundations of the state.
Does the absence of a similar provision in the American Constitution indicate a
greater tolerance in the US for the sort of constitutional incoherence that would result
from the adoption of the Christian nation amendment mentioned earlier? Is the
Guaranty Clause of Article IV relevant to how one ought to think about this question?
2) Do the religion clauses of the First Amendment assume the same constitutive
role in the American Constitution as the “irrevocable” provision in the Turkish
Constitution guaranteeing a secular state? In other words, would the explicit
constitutional recognition of the United States as a Christian nation be a radical
enough assault on the country’s constitutional identity as to render it substantively
something other than an “amendment.”?
3) In Turkey it was plausibly argued that allowing women the right to wear
headscarves was in fact consistent with the secular commitment of the Constitution.
While the wearing of such religious apparel might not have found favor with the
nation’s founders, some rather conventional interpretive theories can easily be
deployed to overcome whatever originalist commitments there might be in Turkish
jurisprudence. Can the same be said in the United States? Is there a theory available
provisions against democratically elected parliaments.” Anthony Arato, “The Turkish Constitutional
Crisis and the Road Beyond,” The American: A Magazine of Ideas, June 30, 2008.
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for changing the American Constitution such that its identification with a particular
religion could avoid the unconstitutional amendment charge in light of the
interpretive freedom implicit in the Establishment Clause?
4) Given the extraordinary difficulties involved in achieving constitutional
change through the formal amendment process in the United States, would not the
adoption of a “Christian nation” amendment represent compelling evidence that the
underlying social tectonics of the polity had shifted to an extent large enough to
require acceptance of the altered change in constitutional identity inherent in
ratification? Are the procedural hurdles of the US amendment process a sufficient
basis for distinguishing the American and Turkish cases?
5) From a constitutional perspective, is the United States an “unfinished
symphony”? What Rogers Smith has offered to students of American politics may
have adaptive potential to the study of comparative constitutionalism: “[A] multiple
traditions approach leads us to expect that the major political parties and actors will
offer varying civic conceptions blending liberal, republican, and ascriptive elements in
different combinations, and that important conflicts will occur over all these
contrasting elements.”18 As the Constitution changes can we afford to incorporate
these alternative conceptions into the document as a rational plan in the finishing of
the composition?
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